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THE ULTIMATE EXPANSION OF THE
YOUNGER DOCTRINE: PENNZOIL CO.
v. TEXACO, INC.
ETWEEN December 28, 1983, and January 6, 1984, Getty Oil Inc.
(Getty) and its two pursuers, Pennzoil Co. (Pennzoil) and Texaco,
Inc. (Texaco), 1 produced two agreements that subsequently became
the subject of an important law suit in the Texas state courts. 2 The battle in
the state court system resulted in a judgment involving billions of dollars. 3
While the jury in the Texas court awarded a record judgment,4 an issue of
1. All three organizations were Fortune 500 companies. In 1983 Texaco ranked sixth in
sales and fifth in total assets among all companies, and third and fifth respectively, among
petroleum refining industries, with $40 billion in sales and $27 billion in assets. Getty Oil
ranked 24th in sales and 23rd in total assets among all companies and 13th and 14th, respec-
tively, within the petroleum industry, with $11.6 billion in sales and $10 billion in assets.
Pennzoil ranked 163rd in sales and 87th in total assets among all companies and 26th and 21st,
respectively, among petroleum refining companies, with $2.3 billion in sales and $3.5 billion in
assets. The Fortune Directory of the Largest US. Industrial Corporations, 109 FORTUNE 274,
276, 282, 314-15 (April 30, 1984).
2. Negotiations between Pennzoil and Getty took place during the first few days of 1984.
After several negotiation sessions and three Getty Board meetings, Getty accepted an offer that
called for $110 and a $5 "stub" per share. Gordon Getty, the sole trustee of the Sarah C.
Getty Trust, which was the largest shareholder of Getty, made an agreement with Pennzoil in
which Gordon Getty would become the Chairman of a restructured Getty. This restructure
was to occur within one year, and if it failed, Getty and Pennzoil agreed to part, with each
company taking its share of the total assets. Pennzoil calculated that its share of assets in-
cluded approximately one billion barrels of oil.
Between the first two Getty meetings, Getty representatives began canvassing for additional
suitors, partly because of dissatisfaction with Pennzoil's offer and partly because of Getty man-
agement's dislike of Gordon Getty. Texaco presented its offer while Getty and Pennzoil were
drafting their written agreement. Eventually the Getty Board accepted Texaco's offer of $128
per share and repudiated its agreement with Pennzoil.
3. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768, 784 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The judgment of $7.53 billion represented the compensatory damages
that Pennzoil allegedly suffered from Texaco's tortious interference, which deprived Pennzoil
of its right to acquire approximately one billion barrels of oil. Id. Pennzoil sued Texaco for
the same amount in punitive damages, but received only $3 billion. Id. The magnitude of the
judgment amount may induce people to perceive this case as being great. As Justice Holmes
remarked in Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904): "[G]reat cases are called
great, not by reason of their real importance in shaping the law of the future, but because of
some accident of immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings and distorts
the judgment." Id. at 400 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (cited in Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 107
S. Ct. 1519, 1534, 95 L. Ed. 2d 1, 25 (1987) (Marshall J., concurring)). This Note discusses
Texaco's case in the federal court system. Texaco's concurrent appeal in the state court system
resulted only in the reduction of the punitive damages to $1 billion. Texaco, 729 S.W.2d at
866. Pennzoil accepted Texaco's settlement offer of $3 billion. Houston Chronicle, Dec. 10,
1987, at 1. This settlement awaits the Texaco shareholders' approval.
4. Texaco, 729 S.W.2d at 784. The jury awarded Pennzoil $7.53 billion in compensatory
damages and $3 billion in punitive damages. Id. The Second Circuit characterized the award
1055
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
greater potential significance arose in the struggle between Pennzoil and
Texaco in the federal courts.
On the same day, but before the state trial court entered judgment, Texaco
brought suit against Pennzoil in the Federal District Court for the Southern
District of New York. 5 Texaco, seeking to enjoin the enforcement of the
state court judgment, pleaded seven claims in the federal court.6 Texaco
theorized that the enforcement of the judgment would violate Texaco's
rights under the United States Constitution. Texaco obtained a temporary
injunction from the district court to prohibit Pennzoil from enforcing the
Texas judgment. 7 Pennzoil filed a counter motion to dissolve the temporary
injunction on the basis that the district court lacked jurisdiction.
The district court not only confirmed its jurisdiction, but also declared
that the ongoing state proceeding did not require abstention by the federal
court.8 Subsequently, the court issued a preliminary injunction against
Pennzoil.9 Pennzoil appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit.' 0 The Second Circuit held that the district court possessed no jurisdic-
tion over five of the seven claims, I but that the district court could lawfully
adjudicate the remaining two claims. 12 As a result, the Second Circuit dis-
as "a private civil money judgment in an amount unprecedented in the annals of legal history
.Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1157 (2d Cir. 1986).
5. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 626 F. Supp. 250, 250 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). The site chosen
for the federal court action is also the site of Texaco's corporate headquarters. Id. at 252.
6. Id. at 251. The district court grouped the seven claims into five categories: (1) claims
one and two alleged that the judgment burdened interstate commerce; (2) claim four alleged
that the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(d)-(e), 78bb (1982), preempted the
judgment; (3) claim five alleged that the trial court misapplied the New York tort law and,
thus, violated the full faith and credit clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 1; (4) claims three
and six alleged that Texas's appeal bond and lien provisions violated the due process and equal
protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; (5) claim
seven alleged that the proceedings in the trial court were unfair and violated the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Texaco, 626 F. Supp. at
251.
7. Texaco, 626 F. Supp. at 251.
8. Id. at 259-61.
9. Id. at 262.
10. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1136 (2d Cir. 1986). The parties
presented oral arguments on February 11, 1986, the day before the Texas appellate court an-
nounced its affirmation of the trial court's decision. The Second Circuit issued its opinion on
February 20, 1986. Id. at 1133.
11. Id. at 1144. The five claims were claims one, two, four, five, and seven. Texaco made
similar claims in the Texas appellate court. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768, 856-
59 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The Texas appellate court held
that Texaco had waived the right to bring arguments under the supremacy, commerce, and
due process clauses. Id. at 858. In addition, the Texas court rejected Texaco's full faith and
credit clause argument. Id.
12. Texaco, 784 F.2d at 1144-45. The third and sixth claims were the due process and
equal protection challenges to the Texas statutory provisions addressing judgment liens and
appeal bonds. In Texas the party who wins a money judgment can place a lien on the defend-
ant's property by recording an abstract of that judgment. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 52.001-
.002 (Vernon 1984 & Supp. 1987); 5 W. DORSANEO, TEXAS LITIGATION GUIDE § 132.01[3]
(1987). That prevailing party may enforce the judgment through a writ of execution. TEX. R.
Civ. P. 621, 622; 5 W. DORSANEO, supra, § 132.02. The defendant, while the case is on ap-
peal, may suspend the execution of either of the above proceedings through a writ of superse-
deas. TEX. R. Civ. P. 368 (current version at TEX. R. APP. P. 47); 5 W. DORSANEO, supra,
§ 132.06[l]. To do so, the defendant/appellant must either post a supersedeas bond or deposit
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missed the five claims over which the district court lacked jurisdiction, af-
firmed the preliminary injunction that the district court had granted, and
reissued the preliminary injunction as a permanent injunction.13
Pennzoil appealed to the Supreme Court. The Court noted probable juris-
diction. 14 Held, reversed and remanded with instruction to vacate order and
dismiss complaint: A state's interest in the enforcement of its courts' judg-
ments justified the application of the abstention doctrine of Younger v. Har-
ris 15 to prohibit the federal district court from interfering in an ongoing state
civil proceeding. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 107 S. Ct. 1519, 95 L. Ed. 2d
1 (1987).
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABSTENTION DOCTRINES
A. Rooker-Feldman Principle: Requirement of Jurisdiction
The abstention doctrines permit federal courts to refrain from exercising
their jurisdiction in the face of ongoing state proceedings. 16 An implicit as-
sumption of these doctrines is that a federal court possesses jurisdiction in
the matter from which the court may abstain. Thus, the initial inquiry
before a court can decide whether it can abstain is to determine whether the
court has jurisdiction.
Both the United States Constitution 17 and the United States Code' 8 make
the Supreme Court the court of review for final state court decisions.
Neither the Constitution nor the Congress has granted appellate jurisdiction
of state court decisions to other courts, such as federal district courts created
under article III. In Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co. 19 the Court held that fed-
eral district courts could not entertain proceedings so as to sit in appellate
review of state court decisions.20 Accordingly, once a state court has adjudi-
cated an issue, only that state's appellate courts, the state supreme court, and
the United States Supreme Court may consider an appeal. 21
In District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman 22 the Court reaf-
an equivalent cash amount. TEX. R. Civ. P. 14c, 364(a) (current version at TEX. R. App. P.
47); 6 W. DORSANEO, supra, § 142.03[1]. The amount of the bond or deposit must equal the
sum of the judgment, interest, and expenses. TEX. R. Civ. P. 364(b) (current version at TEX.
R. App. P. 47); 6 W. DORSANEO, supra, § 142.03[2]. The Texas appellate court may review
and require additional security. TEX. R. Civ. P. 365 (current version at TEX. R. App. P. 49); 6
W. DORSANEO, supra § 142.03[4]. Under these Texas provisions, Texaco needed to post a
bond of over $12 billion, a sum that Texaco could not produce. Texaco, 784 F.2d at 1152.
13. Texaco, 784 F.2d at 1157.
14. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 3270, 91 L. Ed. 2d 561 (1986).
15. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
16. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 9 (5th ed. 1979); see G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 1598-99 (1lth ed. 1985); C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF THE FEDERAL
COURTS § 52 (3d ed. 1976).
17. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
18. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982).
19. 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
20. Id. at 416.
21. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 296
(1970).
22. 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
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firmed the Rooker doctrine. 23 The Court concluded, however, that federal
district courts could review state court decisions in situations involving non-
judicial proceedings. 24 The Feldman Court stressed the importance of ex-
amihing the substance of the proceeding rather than its outward formality to
determine whether the proceeding was judicial. 25 The Court noted that a
district court possesses jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of state
bar rules that the state courts have issued in, nonjudicial hearings. 26 The
Court explained that the review of a nonjudicial proceeding does not consti-
tute review of a final state court judgment. 27 The Court held, however, that
federal district courts do not have jurisdiction over actions alleging the un-
constitutionality of state judicial proceedings. 2 8 The United States Code au-
thorizes only Supreme Court jurisdiction in such cases. 29 The Court added
that the lack of Supreme Court jurisdiction to review a state court judgment,
because of the parties' failure to raise constitutional claims in state court, did
not justify the imposition of district court jurisdiction to review state court
judgments. 30
B. Younger Abstention and its Progeny
Having determined that a federal court possesses jurisdiction in a given
matter, the next question is whether the court should abstain from the exer-
cise of that jurisdiction. Federal district courts may abstain for one of four
reasons. 3 1 First, if the state court can dispose of a case on state law issues,
then the federal court should refrain from determining federal questions.32
Second, if the case involves local administration of local law, then the federal
court should avoid interfering with the exercise of that local prerogative.
3 3
Third, if the case requires the federal court to adjudicate unsettled state law
questions, the federal court should certify such questions to a competent
state court. 3 4 Fourth, a federal court may in certain circumstances dismiss a
23. Id. at 476.
24. Id. at 486.
25. Id. at 477 (in Feldman what appeared to be administrative proceedings were actually
judicial proceedings).
26. Id. at 486.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3) (1982).
30. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482 n.16.
31. C. WRIGHT, supra note 16, § 52, at 218.
32. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941). For a discussion of the
Pullman doctrine of abstention, see C. WRIGHT, supra note 16, § 52, at 218-21. Federalism,
which came to the forefront as a rationale for abstention in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44-
45 (1971), also concerned the Pullman Court. 312 U.S. at 501.
33. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 332 (1943). In Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v.
Southern Ry. Co., 341 U.S. 341, 349-50 (1951), the Supreme Court held that abstention from
exercise of jurisdiction in a Burford-type situation was necessary and not just discretionary.
34. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 212 (1960). The Court held that the post-
ponement of a decision on the federal constitutional issues was not significant enough to over-
come the federalism concerns. Id. at 211-12. Justice Black, in his dissent, stated that this case
presented an example of extending the abstention doctrine too far. Id. at 213 (Black, J., dis-
senting). For a discussion of this abstention doctrine, see C. WRIGHT, supra note 16, § 52, at
224-27.
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case if its docket is too crowded or if the court determines that it cannot
conveniently exercise jurisdiction. 35
In Younger v. Harris36 the Court took the abstention doctrines a step fur-
ther. Younger involved a challenge in the federal court to an indictment that
the state court issued pursuant to the California Criminal Syndicalism Act.37
Harris, the individual that the state court had indicted, sought to have the
federal court enjoin the prosecution under state law because the prosecution,
as well as the Syndicalism Act, allegedly infringed upon his constitutional
rights. 38 The Court, recognizing the long-standing general principle that
the federal courts should not interfere in state proceedings, 39 held that in the
absence of exceptional circumstances federal courts may not enjoin state
criminal prosecutions merely because of the potential unconstitutionality of
state actions. 4° Five companion cases contributed to the formulation of the
Younger doctrine. 41 Nevertheless, uncertainty about the implications of
Younger still remained. 42
35. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947). This approach is the doctrine of
forum non conveniens. C.A. WRIGHT, supra note 16, § 52, at 227.
36. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
37. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11400, 11401 (West 1953) [hereinafter Syndicalism Act].
38. Harris alleged that the prosecution and the Syndicalism Act violated his rights of free
speech and press under the first and fourteenth amendments, U.S. CONST. amends. I, XIV.
Younger, 401 U.S. at 39.
39. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43.
40. Id. at 54. The Court indicated that showings of bad faith and harassment could qual-
ify as exceptional circumstances justifying federal intervention. Id. Moreover, the Court, cit-
ing Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 402 (1941), declared that in certain situations a statute
could violate constitutional rights to such an extent that the federal courts could intervene.
Younger, 401 U.S. at 53-54. The Buck Court stated: "It is of course conceivable that a statute
might be flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions in every clause,
sentence and paragraph, and in whatever manner and against whomever an effort might be
made to apply it." Buck, 313 U.S. at 402.
41. Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 73 (1971) (federal court should abstain given pend-
ing state prosecution under criminal anarchy statute); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77, 81 (1971)
("normal course of state criminal prosecutions cannot be disrupted or blocked on the basis of
charges which in the last analysis amount to nothing more than speculation about the future");
Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 85 (1971) (improper federal interference of court into state
criminal prosecution when record showed no evidence of bad faith attempts to enforce state
law); Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200, 203 (1971) (federal intervention in state criminal proceed-
ings by injunction or declaratory judgment not justified unless record indicates threat of irrepa-
rable injury); Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216, 220 (1971) (federal injunction against pending
and future state criminal prosecutions under state obscenity law not justified when record did
not show that one's defense against state prosecution could not remove threat to one's federal
rights).
42. One commentator noted that the Younger Court left four issues unresolved. Note,
The New Federal Comity." Pursuit of Younger Ideas in a Civil Context, 61 IOWA L. REV. 784,
794-98 (1976). The first issue questioned whether the Younger doctrine reached the request for
declaratory judgment in the pending criminal prosecution. Id. at 794. The answer came in the
companion case, Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 73 (1971), in which the Court held that
requests for declaratory judgments and for injunctions should receive the same consideration.
The second issue addressed whether declaratory judgment was appropriate when the state
merely threatens criminal prosecution. Note, supra, at 795. The answer came in Steffel v.
Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 461-62 (1974), in which the Court held that neither Younger nor
Samuels applied, and "federalism [had] little vitality" in this context. The third issue ques-
tioned whether injunctive relief was appropriate when the state merely threatens criminal pros-
ecution. Note, supra, at 795-96. The answer came in Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922,
930 (1975), in which the Court held the Younger restrictions not applicable. The fourth issue
1987] NOTES 1059
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The lower courts initially limited the scope of the Younger abstention al-
most exclusively to situations involving pending state criminal prosecu-
tions.4 3 Except for isolated comments from the Third, Fourth, Fifth, and
Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals, the federal courts remained silent on the
question of whether Younger required the federal courts to abstain when
only a state civil proceeding, as opposed to a criminal proceeding, was pend-
ing.44 Some Justices on the Supreme Court similarly hinted at the possibil-
ity that the application of the Younger doctrine did not hinge on the
criminal/civil characterization of a particular proceeding. 45 The Court,
however, did not directly address the issue of extension of Younger to non-
criminal cases until 1975, when it decided Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.46
Prior to Huffman, the Supreme Court had two opportunities to extend
Younger to noncriminal settings. In 1973 a three-judge federal panel held
that Younger would bar federal intervention in a civil proceeding in a Geor-
gia state court.47 The judges viewed the civil proceeding as a prosecution of
the state's criminal law.48 Instead of confronting the Younger issues, the
Supreme Court vacated the decision because the Georgia Supreme Court
had invalidated the state statute involved in the case in the interim.
49
Sosna v. Iowa 50 presented the Court with its next opportunity. Justice
Rehnquist stated that the Court had asked the parties to consider the appli-
concerned whether Younger abstention applied to civil proceedings. Note, supra, at 796-98.
After a hesitant start, the Court finally answered with a resounding yes, as evidenced initially
in Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975), and most recently in Pennzoil Co. v.
Texaco, Inc., 107 S. Ct. 1519, 1529, 95 L. Ed. 2d 1, 19-20 (1987).
43. Lewis v. Kugler, 446 F.2d 1343, 1347-48 (3d Cir. 1971); Maldonado v. County of
Monterey, 330 F. Supp. 1282, 1284 (N.D. Cal. 1971). For additional cases, see Note, Implica-
tions of the Younger Cases for the Availability of Federal Equitable Relief when No State Prose-
cution is Pending, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 874, 895 n.135 (1972); Note, Federal Relief Against
Threatened State Prosecutions: The Implications of Younger, Lake Carriers and Roe, 48
N.Y.U. L. REV. 965, 988-90 (1973).
44. See Roy v. Jones, 484 F.2d 96, 102 (3d Cir. 1973) (Aldisert, J., concurring) (not lim-
ited in conceptual basis to criminal cases only); Lynch v. Snepp, 472 F.2d 769, 773 (4th Cir.
1973) (labels "civil" and "criminal" not fulcrum of Younger); Palaio v. McAuliffe, 466 F.2d
1230, 1232-33 (5th Cir. 1972) (not dependent on labels); Cousins v. Wigoda, 463 F.2d 603, 606
(7th Cir. 1972) (Younger rationale, though less compelling in civil proceeding, still applicable).
For a discussion of these cases, see Note, supra note 42, at 801-05.
45. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 244 (1972) (Burger, C.J., concurring); Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 55 n.2 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring); see Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67,
98 (1972) (White, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun joined Justice
White's Fuentes dissent in which he stated that the Court should vacate the district court's
decision and remand the case for reconsideration in light of Younger. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 98
(White, J., dissenting). In Fuentes, a case involving a state provision for prejudgment replevin
in a private dispute, the Court came closest to extending Younger to civil settings prior to
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975). See Note, supra note 42, at 800. Justices
Powell and Rehnquist did not take part in the 4-3 Fuentes decision. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 68.
46. 420 U.S. 592, 594 (1975).
47. Speight v. Slaton, 356 F. Supp. 1101, 1102 (N.D. Ga. 1973), vacated, 415 U.S. 333
(1974).
48. Id.
49. Speight v. Slaton, 415 U.S. 333, 334-35 (1974). The case addressed Georgia's criminal
public nuisance statute. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2103 (Harrison 1983). The Georgia Supreme
Court had invalidated the statute in Sanders v. State, 231 Ga. 608, 611, 203 S.E.2d 153, 155
(1974).
50. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
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cability of the Younger doctrine to a situation in which the appellant sought
relief in federal court from a civil proceeding, rather than appealing through
the state courts. 51 The parties, nevertheless, urged the Court to decide the
case on the merits.52 Thus, the Court did not decide the Younger issue. 53
Two months later, the Court finally addressed the issue of the extension of
Younger to civil proceedings. 54
In Huffman local officials prosecuted the defendant on the basis of a viola-
tion of a public nuisance statute.55 According to the Court, since nuisance
proceedings were sufficiently similar to criminal prosecutions, a court should
exercise abstention in the former, as well as in the latter.56 The Court held
that the focal point of Younger depended on the concerns arising from the
existence of the pending state proceeding and not whether the case involved
a criminal prosecution. 57 The court, therefore, noted that the Younger doc-
trine applied in Huffman even though the state court action was a civil
proceeding. 58
Both the majority and the dissent recognized the innovative nature of this
decision. 59 The Court delivered two sets of guidelines for the lower courts.
The first set related to the required procedural steps for the application of
Younger, and the second set related to types of civil proceedings to which the
courts will apply Younger.60
In connection with the first set of guidelines, the Court held that in order
to abstain from jurisdiction, as with criminal proceedings, a pending state
proceeding should exist, 61 and the parties must have exhausted all available
state proceedings. 62 The second set of guidelines dealt with the question of
what type of state civil proceedings received such deference that federal dis-
trict courts should abstain from exercising their jurisdiction. The Huffman
court gave two rules. First, the more the civil proceeding resembled a crimi-
nal proceeding, the more a federal court should give it deference. 63 Second,
the greater the state's involvement in the proceeding, the greater the need for
51. Id. at 396 n.3; see Sosna v. Iowa, 415 U.S. 911, 911 (1974).
52. Sosna, 419 U.S. 396 n.3.
53. Id.
54. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 594 (1975). Justice Rehnquist often served as
a lightning rod for criticism of Huffman and extension of the Younger doctrine. See Shapiro,
Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HARV. L. REV. 293, 317 (1976); Soifer &
Macgill, The Younger Doctrine: Reconstructing Reconstruction, 55 TEX. L. REV. 1141, 1173
(1977); Note, The Compleat Jeffersonian: Justice Rehnquist and Federalism, 91 YALE L.J.
1317, 1343 (1982).
55. OHio REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3767.01-.99 (Anderson 1980).
56. Huffman v. Pursue Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604-05 (1975).
57. Id. at 606. The Court stated: "Younger turned on considerations of comity and feder-
alism peculiar to the fact that state proceedings were pending ... Id.
58. Id. at 594.
59. Id. at 594 (majority opinion), 615 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 604-08.
61. Id. at 607. This requirement paralleled the holding in Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S.
452, 462 (1974) (district court may grant declaratory relief if no pending state proceeding).
62. Huffman, 420 U.S. at 608. A federal court may interfere, however, if exceptional
circumstances justify intervention. Id. For a discussion of exceptional circumstances under
Younger, see supra note 40.
63. Huffman, 420 U.S. at 604; see Bartels, Avoiding a Comity of Errors." A Model for
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abstention in deference to the state. 64 The Huffman Court denied that it
was setting forth a general rule for all civil litigation, 65 yet it soon found
other state civil litigations that appeared similar to the proceedings in
Huffman.
In Juidice v. Vail 66 the defendant sought relief from a contempt of court
citation, a proceeding that the Court conceded possessed less state interest
than a quasi-criminal proceeding, such as the nuisance proceeding in
Huffman. 67 Rather than recharacterizing the proceeding as quasi-criminal,
the Court simply regarded the centrality that the contempt proceeding occu-
pied in the state judicial system as pivotal and justifying the use of principles
that Huffman and Younger had developed.68 The Court clarified that, when
construing Huffman, courts should emphasize the concept of comity be-
tween federal and state courts. 69 A federal court should give deference to
state courts regardless of the nature of the proceeding involved, as long as a
sufficient state interest exists.70 The Court expanded the Younger doctrine,
albeit not completely. 7'
In Trainor v. Hernandez72 the state department of public aid, faced with
the option of bringing either a criminal or civil action against the defendant,
chose the civil action.73 The Court concluded that the nature of the pro-
ceeding became insignificant due to the importance of the state interest when
the state is acting in its capacity as a sovereign. 74 The Court admitted at last
that courts should construe the Younger and Huffman principles broadly
when the state involved itself as a sovereign. 75 Thus, the Court applied the
abstention doctrine of Younger to the civil proceeding in Trainor.76
In Moore v. Sims 77 the Court returned to the Huffman reliance on the
similarity between particular civil proceedings and criminal proceedings. 78
The Court held that because the state was a party, and that because the
temporary removal of a child in a case involving child abuse was quasi-crim-
Adjudicating Federal Civil Rights Suits that "Interfere" with State Civil Proceedings, 29 STAN.
L. REV. 27, 46 (1976); The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARV. L. REV. 47, 154 (1975).
64. Huffman, 420 U.S. at 604-05; see The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, supra note 63, at
154 (1975).
65. Huffman, 420 U.S. at 607.
66. 430 U.S. 327 (1977).
67. Id. at 335; Huffman, 420 U.S. at 604.
68. Juidice, 430 U.S. at 335-36.
69. Id. at 334.
70. Id. at 335-36.
71. Id. at 336 n.13 (disclaiming, as in Huffman, that Court was making general rule for all
civil litigation).
72. 431 U.S. 434 (1977).
73. Id. at 435. The State of Illinois brought a civil action against the defendants to re-
cover welfare payments dispersed to them. The defendant allegedly had fraudulently con-
cealed assets during application. Such concealment constituted a crime under Illinois law.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 11-21 (Smith-Hurd 1968).
74. Trainor, 431 U.S. at 444.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. 442 U.S. 415 (1979).
78. Id. at 423.
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inal, the abstention doctrine of Younger should apply.79 After Moore the
Court returned to the factor of state involvement in Middlesex County Ethics
Committee v. Garden State Bar Association.80 The operative concept became
the more general notion of state interest, rather than state involvement in the
role of sovereign. 81 The Court held that the state bar disciplinary proceed-
ing in Middlesex County implicated extremely important state interests. 82
Similarity with a criminal proceeding receded further as a necessary factor.
The Court considered the administrative nature of the disciplinary proceed-
ings as insignificant. 83 When sufficient judicial trappings adorned the pro-
ceeding, the justifications for deference to state interest and abstention would
exist. 84
The Court applied the reasoning of Middlesex County in Ohio Civil Rights
Commission v. Dayton Christian Schools, 85 a case involving sex discrimina-
tion issues. The Court held that the state should have an opportunity to
dispose of the case, unfettered by federal interference, as long as the case
involved an important state interest and the litigants were given an opportu-
nity to raise their constitutional claims. 86 Moreover, under the rule of Mid-
dlesex County, if the parties can raise constitutional issues in the state court
review of administrative proceedings, then the state has sufficiently ad-
dressed the parties' constitutional concerns. 87
In summary, the Court has greatly expanded the reach of the Younger
doctrine of abstention. Initially the Court applied the doctrine only to crimi-
nal proceedings. 88 Currently, the doctrine encompasses state proceedings,
judicial and administrative, as long as the proceedings involve a sufficiently
important state interest and the litigants eventually receive an opportunity to
raise constitutional claims in the state court system. 89 While the scope of
Younger had greatly increased, a question still remained as to what other
types of state proceedings constituted sufficient state interest to justify the
application of the Younger abstention doctrine.
79. Id.
80. 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982). The case involved disciplinary action against a New Jersey
attorney for unethical conduct. The state supreme court was authorized to review the admin-
istrative proceeding.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 434-35.
83. Id. at 435.
84. Id. at 435-36.
85. 106 S. Ct. 2718, 2723-24, 91 L. Ed. 2d 512, 523-24 (1986) (reasoning that administra-
tive proceedings were judicial in nature and that sex discrimination issues were important to
state).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 2724, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 523; Middlesex County, 457 U.S. at 436.
88. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
89. Dayton Christian Schools, 106 S. Ct. at 2723-24, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 523-24.
1987] 1063
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
II. PENNZOIL Co. V TEXAcO, INC.
A. Issues
In Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc.90 the United States Supreme Court ex-
panded the scope of Younger by holding that the enforcement of state court
judgments constituted a state interest sufficient to justify the application of
the Younger abstention doctrine. 9' The large damage award, the complex
relationship among the parties, and the circus-like atmosphere tended to
cloud the real issues in the federal court case. 92 Pennzoil built its case
around the threshold question of whether a federal district court could law-
fully exercise its jurisdiction over a party in a state court suit when an appeal
in state court was pending. 93 As the Second Circuit noted, this question has
two aspects: First, did the federal court have jurisdiction? And second, if it
did, should the court have abstained from adjudicating the case and from
granting the preliminary injunction pending the appeal?94
The lower courts had addressed these questions using three basic theories.
Pennzoil built its arguments in the district court on these theories. 95 Theo-
ries derived from the Anti-Injunction Act 96 and the Rooker-Feldman doc-
trine97 addressed the first question. The abstention doctrine addressed the
90. 107 S. Ct. 1519, 95 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1987).
91. Id. at 1529, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 19-20.
92. Texaco raised 90 points of error in the state appellate court. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil
Co., 729 S.W.2d 768, 866 (Tex. App.-Houston [lIst Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The court
only upheld the point of error dealing with excessive punitive damages. Id. The court reduced
these damages from $3 billion to $1 billion. Id.
93. Pennzoil, 107 S. Ct. at 1523-24, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 13.
94. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1141 (2d Cir. 1986). For a discussion of
the Second Circuit's holding, see supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
95. Pennzoil, 107 S. Ct. at 1523-24, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 13.
96. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982). The Anti-Injunction Act prohibits federal courts from stay-
ing state proceedings through an injunction. Id. Federal district courts have long identified
the concepts of comity and federalism as supporting this Act. See, e.g., United States v. Wash-
ington, 459 F. Supp. 1020, 1028 n.3 (W.D. Wash. 1978), aff'don other grounds, 645 F.2d 749(9th Cir. 1981) (Act embodies principles of comity); Landry v. Daley, 288 F. Supp. 200, 223(N.D. Ill. 1968) (Act as statutory equivalent of doctrine of comity); In re Freeze, 234 F. Supp.
427, 428-29 (E.D.S.C. 1964) (invocation of doctrine of comity with regard to injunction appli-
cation must be reasonable).
The Act, however, also provided exceptions to its own application and required Congress to
expressly authorize these exceptions. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982). In Mitchum v. Foster, 407
U.S. 225, 242-43 (1972), the Court held that express authorization was required only for rights
that Congress had created, such as those rights guaranteed under the Civil Rights Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). The district court held that all of Texaco's claims arose under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1982), thereby giving the court jurisdiction. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 626 F.
Supp. 250, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). The Second Circuit declared that Texaco's third and sixth
claims arose under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), so that the Anti-Injunction Act did not prohibit
district court jurisdiction. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1145-47 (2d Cir.
1986).
97. For a discussion of the Rooker-Feldman principle, see supra notes 19-28 and accom-
panying text. The district court held that the fact situation did not fit the Rooker-Feldman
pattern. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 626 F. Supp. 250, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). The district
court stated that it did not attempt to review the state court decision and that it was only
trying to assure Texaco of an opportunity to raise its constitutional claims. Id. The likelihood
of Texaco prevailing on these claims contributed to the court's decision. Id. at 253-54. The
Second Circuit held that the Rooker-Feldman principle would bar five of Texaco's claims be-
cause the state court had already adjudicated those issues. Texaco, 784 F.2d at 1143-44. The
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second question. The Supreme Court ruled only on the second question.98
After summarizing the facts, the Court reversed the Second Circuit.99 The
Court gave three reasons for the need to abstain from entertaining Texaco's
claims and answered the two major objections that Texaco had raised
against abstention." °0 The Court then concluded that the district court
should have abstained from the exercise of its jurisdiction. 10 1
B. Rooker-Feldman Principle
The Supreme Court did not reach the Rooker-Feldman issue. 10 2 The
Court based its decision solely on the issues involving the Younger doc-
trine.10 3 Absent the Younger abstention, Texaco would have prevailed on
the jurisdiction question relating to two of its claims, as occurred in the Sec-
ond Circuit. 104 An analysis of the Justices' opinions indicated that Texaco
would have garnered five votes for sustaining the Second Circuit's holding
that the Rooker-Feldman principle did not prohibit federal court
jurisdiction.
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice O'Connor, noted that the Rooker-Feld-
man doctrine would not eliminate the Court's jurisdiction because the par-
ties had not litigated the two remaining issues in state court and because
such issues were not "inextricably intertwined" with other issues litigated in
the state court.10 5 Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens declared that
the case involved collateral review, and thus Rooker-Feldman did not bar
jurisdiction of the federal district court.10 6 Justice Marshall, while joining
the opinions of Brennan and Stevens, took a contrary position on this doc-
trine. 0 7 Marshall declared that the district court lacked jurisdiction under
Rooker-Feldman because the constitutional claims were inextricably inter-
court held that the remaining two claims were not barred because Texaco had not raised them
in state court and they were not "'inextricably intertwined' with the barred claims." Id. at
1144 (citing District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482-83 n.16
(1983)). Pennzoil contended that the district court should have read the principle broadly to
include these two claims. Id. The Second Circuit, nevertheless, declined to apply the principle
broadly. Id.
98. Pennzoil, 107 S. Ct. at 1525-29, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 15-20. The majority opinion referred
to the Anti-Injunction Act and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine only in its summary of facts and
procedural history. Id. at 1523-24, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 13-14.
99. Id. at 1525, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 15.
100. Id. at 1525-29, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 15-19.
101. Id. at 1529, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 19. The Court explained that the scope of its decision did
not reach the merits of Texaco's underlying claims. Id., 95 L. Ed. 2d at 20.
102. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
103. Pennzoil, 107 S. Ct. at 1525-29, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 15-20.
104. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1144-45 (2d Cir. 1986) (two claims not
raised and not inextricably intertwined).
105. Pennzoil, 107 S. Ct. at 1529-30, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 20 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice
Scalia's point would be meaningless unless its force is extended to the lower federal courts,
even though he appeared to be speaking only of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction. See id.
106. Id. at 1531, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 22 (Brennan, J., concurring); Id. at 1534-35, 95 L. Ed. 2d
at 26 (Blackmun, J., concurring); Id. at 1536 n.3, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 28 n.3 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring) (following earlier opinion in District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S.
462, 490 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
107. Id. at 1533, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 24-25.
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twined with the issues in the state court proceeding. 08 The five Justices,
even without Justice Marshall, would constitute a majority; the Younger ab-
stention, however, proved to be a hurdle too high for Texaco.
C. Younger Doctrine
The United States Supreme Court set forth three reasons why the district
court should have abstained from exercising its jurisdiction. 109 The first rea-
son concerned the nature of equity jurisprudence. 110 Generally, a court of
equity should refrain from interfering with a court of law, especially when
the case involves a criminal prosecution and when the litigant can pursue an
available alternative legal remedy."' The Court quoted the Younger v. Har-
ris 112 decision on equitable restraint without elaboration. 11
The second reason that the Court asserted for a federal court to abstain
from adjudicating cases in which proceedings have begun in the state court
involved the concept of comity. 114 The comity concept addresses the rela-
tionship between the national and state governments, and more particularly
between federal and state courts. 115 The Younger court had placed greater
emphasis on this reason than on the first reason for the abstention doc-
trine.' 16 According to Younger, the federal government should not interfere
with the state's prerogative to carry out legitimate state activities." 17
In decisions following Younger, the Court equated the legitimate interest
of the state with legitimate activities of the state. 18 If the proceeding is
noncriminal, then the state's interest must be important. 1' 9 The decisions
that invoked Younger in noncriminal settings all involved cases in which the
state possessed a stake in the outcome. 120 The present case, however, in-
volved a purely private dispute, and arguably the State of Texas maintained
only a tangential interest. 12 1 The Court, nevertheless, held that the case in-
108. Id. at 1533-34, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 24-25.
109. Id. at 1525-27, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 15-17.
110. Id. at 1525-26, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 15.
111. See id.; Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971).
112. 401 U.S. at 37.
113. Pennzoil, 107 S. Ct. at 1525, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 15. The Younger condition for abstention
goes beyond the mere existence of an alternative legal channel. The Younger decision also
requires that the movant "not suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief." Younger, 401
U.S. at 43-44. One may gain a false impression from the truncated quotation by Powell in
Pennzoil, 107 S. Ct. at 1525, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 15, that Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44, stood for the
notion that a mere "adequate remedy at law" is an insurmountable barrier.
114. Pennzoil, 107 S. Ct. at 1525-26, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 15.
115. Younger, 401 U.S. at 44.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 444 (1977) (state brought suit to support
state welfare program); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 335 (1977) (state's interest in its con-
tempt process); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975) (state is party to nuisance
proceeding).
119. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2718, 2723,
91 L. Ed. 2d 512, 523 (1986).
120. See supra notes 56-89 and accompanying text.
121. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 107 S. Ct. 1519, 1536 n.2, 95 L. Ed. 2d 1, 28 n.2 (Ste-
vens, J., concurring). Justice Powell, writing for the majority, however, declared that this case
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volved an important state interest related to the state's ability to enforce
orders and judgments of its courts. 122
The third reason for abstaining was the preservation of limited federal
judicial resources. 123 The Court wanted to avoid deciding issues that it need
not address. 124 Until the courts of the state judicial system have rendered a
final decision, the federal decision might become advisory or even discred-
ited upon the completion of the state proceeding. 125 The Court noted that
this reason assumed additional importance in this case because Texaco did
not litigate the constitutional issues in the trial court.
12 6
The Court, then, moved on to answer Texaco's objections against the ap-
plication of the Younger abstention. 127 Texaco first argued that the case im-
plicated no important state interest. Justice Stevens echoed this sentiment in
his separate opinion concurring in the judgment. 128 The Court answered by
pointing to Juidice v. Vail.' 29 The Court construed the Juidice opinion
broadly to refer to all facets of the administration of the state judicial sys-
tem. 130 The federal district courts, therefore, should abstain under these cir-
cumstances so as not to infringe upon the operation of the state courts. 131
Texaco next argued that abstention from entertaining its claims would be
inappropriate in this case. Texaco claimed that the rules of Texas appellate
procedure precluded Texaco from asserting its constitutional rights. 132 The
Court held Texaco's claim to be groundless as it did not fairly characterize
Texas law. 133 The fact that Texaco made no attempt to avail itself of the
Texas appellate procedure prior to coming to the federal courts hurt Tex-
aco's assertion of preclusion. 34 Applying Texas law, the Court held that
Texaco had an opportunity to raise its constitutional claims. 135 The Court
surmised that had Texaco taken advantage of the opportunity, Texaco
would likely have witnessed positive results. 136
The Court, therefore, held that the district court should have abstained. 137
The state's interest in enforcing orders and judgments of its courts justified
went to the very essence of the state judicial system. Id. at 1527 & n. 12, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 17 &
n.12.
122. Id. at 1527, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 17.
123. Id. at 1526-27, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 16-17. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), did not
present this rationale.
124. Pennzoil, 107 S. Ct. at 1526, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 16.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1527-29, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 17-19.
128. Id. at 1536 n.2, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 28 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring).
129. 430 U.S. 327, 335 (1977).
130. Pennzoil, 107 S. Ct. at 1527, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 17.
131. Id. (citing Juidice, 430 U.S. at 335).
132. TEX. R. Civ. P. 364 (current version at TEX. R. App. P. 47). The Court noted the
lack of specificity of Texaco's claim. Pennzoil, 107 S. Ct. at 1528 n.15, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 19 n.15.




137. Id. at 1529, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 19.
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the application of the Younger doctrine. 138 The principles of comity and
federalism mandated the district court's deferral to the proceedings in the
state system. 139
Four justices wrote separate opinions concurring only in the judgment.
Justice Brennan devoted almost his entire opinion to an attack of the Court's
application of the Younger doctrine.140 He relied upon the reasoning of his
dissent in Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd. 141 Brennan reasoned that in a noncrimi-
nal proceeding, the district court, as a rule, should not apply the Younger
doctrine.142 According to Brennan, when a party brings a civil proceeding
under section 1983 of the United States Code, 143 as Brennan claimed was the
case before the Court, abstention is especially inappropriate. 144 Brennan did
not find federalism an issue because he considered Texas's interest negligi-
ble. 145 Brennan concurred in the judgment, however, because he felt Tex-
aco's claim that Texas rules violated Texaco's constitutional rights was
without merit. 146 Texaco could go forward with its appeal even if the corpo-
ration were to file for bankruptcy. 147 Bankruptcy proceedings would not
prevent Texaco or its successor after reorganization from appealing the
Texas trial court decision.' 48
Justice Marshall rejected the Court's reasoning. 149 He agreed, however,
with the disposition of the case. 150 He stated that the question regarding
abstention should not arise because the district court lacked jurisdiction. 15'
Marshall indicated that he would reverse should he reach the merits. 152
Justice Blackmun agreed with Justices Brennan and Stevens that the dis-
trict court should not abstain based on the Younger doctrine.153 Blackmun
objected to the Court's expansion of the Younger abstention to all pending
state cases, criminal or civil.' 54 According to Blackmun, under the Court's
reasoning, no state interest would be too insignificant to allow the federal
courts to proceed despite a concurrent state court proceeding.155 Blackmun
138. Id. at 1527, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 17.
139. Id. at 1529, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 19-20.
140. Id. at 1530, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 20 (Brennan, J., concurring).
141. 420 U.S. 592, 613-18 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
142. 107 S. Ct. at 1530, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 21 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Huffman, 420
U.S. at 613 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
143. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
144. Pennzoil, 107 S. Ct. at 1530, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 22 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing
Huffman, 420 U.S. at 616 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242
(1972)).
145. Id., 95 L. Ed. 2d at 21 (Brennan, J., concurring).
146. Id. at 1531-32, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 22-23 (Brennan, J., concurring).
147. Id., 95 L. Ed. 2d at 23 (Brennin, J., concurring).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1532, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 23 (Marshall, J., concurring).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. (accepting the opinions of Justices Brennan and Stevens that Texaco's case was
without merit); see supra notes 146-48 and accompanying text & infra note 162.
153. Pennzoil, 107 S. Ct. at 1534, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 26 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
154. Id. (expansion to "an unprecedented extent").
155. Id. (abstention regardless of attenuation of state interest and regardless of harm that
federal plaintiffs suffered).
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would have ordered the district court to abstain, but he would have done so
only under the doctrine presented in Railroad Commission v. Pullman
Co.;1 56 the procedural facts presented in Pennzoil met the requirements of
the Pullman doctrine. 157 The federal court should not proceed until after
the state courts have reached a final disposition of the case.' 58 Justice Pow-
ell, writing for the Court, considered Blackmun's distinction between the
two types of abstention unnecessarily narrow.159 Powell stated that no clear
line of demarcation existed between the two doctrines to warrant such
mechanical application of one doctrine over the other. 16°
Justice Stevens presented a strong opposition, even though he relegated
the discussion of the Younger abstention to a footnote. 16 1 He agreed with
the Second Circuit that the state interest in the line of cases from Huffman
to Dayton Christian Schools differed drastically from the state interest in
Pennzoil. 162 Powell, on the other hand, while writing for the Court, replied
that the interests in those cases revolved around the authority of the state
judicial system in general. 163
III. CONCLUSION
Of the seven cases in the Huffman-Pennzoil line, only the Huffman major-
156. 312 U.S. 496 (1941). For a discussion of the Pullman doctrine, see supra note 32 and
accompanying text.
157. Pennzoil, 107 S. Ct. at 1535, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 27 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice
Blackmun considered questions regarding Texas state laws by no means settled. Id. The state
courts might yet consider the constitutionality of the lien and bond provisions. Id. Justice
Blackmun's preference for the less extensive Pullman abstention doctrine paralleled Justice
Stewart's rationale when he changed positions in Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 347 (1977)
(Stewart, J., dissenting).
158. Pennzoil, 107 S. Ct. at 1535, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 27 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
159. Id. at 1526 n.9, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 16 n.9.
160. Id. Commentators fall on both sides of the argument. Compare Field, Abstention in
Constitutional Cases. The Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1071,
1078 (1974) (no clear line of demarcation) and Ziegler, Rights Require Remedies: A New Ap-
proach to the Enforcement of Rights in the Federal Courts, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 665, 691-92
(1987) (same practical result) with Fallon, Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law Litiga-
tion: Notes on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 65 n.345 (1984) (different
procedure) and Guggenheim, State Intervention in the Family: Making a Federal Case Out of
It, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 399, 418-19 (1984) (difference in degree of finality) and Ziegler, supra, at
691 (difference in theory) and Comment, State Waiver and Forfeiture of the Exhaustion Re-
quirement in Habeas Corpus Actions, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 354, 372 n.123 (1983) (difference in
purpose).
161. Pennzoil, 107 S. Ct. at 1536 n.2, 95 L. Ed. at 28 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice
Stevens concurred in the judgment because he thought Texaco's case was without merit. Id. at
1535-38, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 28-31 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens stated that since the
federal, constitution did not guarantee the right to stay execution of judgment, no due process
violation existed. Id. at 1537, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 30 (Stevens, J., concurring). He further stated
that the Texas appellate court did not violate the equal protection clause by refusing to grant a
stay to Texaco even though the court had granted such stays to other appellants. Id. at 1537-
38, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 30 (Stevens, J., concurring). According to Stevens, the state did not act
arbitrarily or capriciously. Id. at 1538, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 30 (Stevens, J., concurring).
162. Id. at 1535, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 28 (Stevens, J., concurring).




ity opinion garnered six votes; the other cases received only five votes.1 64
Justices dissented in the first four cases. 1 65 Those Justices who disagreed
with the abstention rationale of the majority in the last three cases, neverthe-
less concurred in the judgments. 166 Despite the narrowness of these mar-
gins, these cases have established the application of the Younger doctrine in
civil proceedings. Except for Justice Blackmun, each Justice, to the extent
that he or she was on the Court at the time, has taken a definite position on
this issue. 167 Justice Blackmun's shift demonstrates the extent to which the
164. Pennzoil, 107 S. Ct. at 1519, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 1 (5-4 decision); Ohio Civil Rights
Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2718, 91 L. Ed. 2d 512 (1986) (5-4
decision); Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982) (5-
4 decision); Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979) (5-4 decision); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S.
434 (1977) (5-4 decision); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977) (5-4 decision); Huffman v. Pur-
sue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975) (6-3 decision). Strictly speaking, the first four cases were really
9-0 decisions, as all Justices joined or concurred in the judgment.
165. Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 435 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Trainor v. Her-
nandez, 431 U.S. 434, 448, 450, 460 (1977) (Stewart, J., Brennan, J., Stevens, J., dissenting);
Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 341, 347 (1977) (Brennan, J., Stewart, J., dissenting); Huffman v.
Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 613 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
166. Pennzoil, 107 S. Ct. at 1532, 1534, 1535, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 23, 26, 28 (Marshall, J.,
Blackmun, J., Stevens, J., concurring); Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian
Schools, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2718, 2724, 91 L. Ed. 2d 512, 523 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring);
Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 438 (1982) (Mar-
shall, J., concurring).
167. Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court four times. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Day-
ton Christian Schools, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2718, 2720, 91 L. Ed. 2d 512, 518 (1986); Moore v.
Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 417 (1979); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 328 (1977); Huffman v. Pursue,
Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 593 (1975). Chief Justice Burger, in Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v.
Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 424 (1982), Justices White, in Trainor v. Hernandez,
431 U.S. 434, 435 (1977), and Powell, in Pennzoil, 107 S. Ct. at 1522, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 11, each
wrote for the Court once. Chief Justice Rehnquist, besides writing for the Court four times,
joined the majority opinion the other three times. Pennzoil, 107 S. Ct. at 1522, 95 L. Ed. 2d at
11; Middlesex County, 457 U.S. at 424; Trainor, 431 U.S. at 435. Justice Powell, author of the
Pennzoil decision, joined the majority opinion in the other six cases. Dayton Christian Schools,
106 S. Ct. at 2720, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 518; Middlesex County, 457 U.S. at 424; Moore, 442 U.S. at
417; Trainor, 431 U.S. at 435; Juidice, 430 U.S. at 328; Huffman, 420 U.S. at 593. Justice
White also joined the majority at every opportunity. Pennzoil, 107 S. Ct. at 1522, 95 L. Ed. 2d
at 11; Dayton Christian Schools, 106 S. Ct. at 2720, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 518; Middlesex County, 457
U.S. at 424; Moore, 442 U.S. at 417; Juidice, 430 U.S. at 328; Huffman, 420 U.S. at 593.
Justice O'Connor joined the majority on every occasion. Pennzoil, 107 S. Ct. at 1522, 95 L.
Ed. 2d at 11; Dayton Christian Schools, 106 S. Ct. at 2720, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 518; Middlesex
County, 457 U.S. at 424. Justice Scalia was not on the Court for any of the previous six
decisions.
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens did not join any of the majority opinions. Justice
Brennan wrote his own dissent on three of the four cases in which a dissent existed. Trainor,
431 U.S. at 450 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Juidice, 430 U.S. at 341 (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Huffman, 420 U.S. at 613 (Brennan, J., dissenting). He joined Justice Stevens's dissenting
opinion in the fourth case. Moore, 442 U.S. at 435 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens did
not take part in the Huffiman decision; however, he authored three opinions, one dissenting
and two concurring in the judgment, while disagreeing with the majority on the Younger issue.
Pennzoil, 107 S. Ct. at 1535, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 28 (Stevens, J., concurring); Trainor, 431 U.S. at
460 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Juidice, 430 U.S. at 339 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Mar-
shall generally joined with either Justice Brennan, Justice Stevens, or both. He wrote concur-
ring opinions in only two cases. Pennzoil, 107 S. Ct. at 1532, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 23 (Marshall, J.,
concurring); Middlesex County, 457 U.S. at 438 (Marshall, J., concurring). Chief Justice Bur-
ger and Justice Blackmun joined the majority in the first four cases. Moore, 442 U.S. at 417;
Trainor, 431 U.S. at 435; Juidice, 430 U.S. at 328; Huffman, 420 U.S. at 593. Justice Stewart
cast a dissenting vote in three of the 5-4 decisions. Moore, 442 U.S. at 435 (Stevens, J., dissent-
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Court expanded the abstention doctrine.
Given the disparate views of the Supreme Court Justices, what is the fu-
ture for litigants in a state court? By not discussing the jurisdiction question,
the Court made the abstention doctrine the overriding concern when these
litigants come to the federal courts. With its generous characterization of
the state interest in its own judicial system, the Pennzoil Court closed the
federal forum to potential federal plaintiffs when state proceedings are pend-
ing until these plaintiffs have exhausted all avenues for federal constitutional
claims in the state system. Under Pennzoil, a court would consider just
about any challenge to a state proceeding a threat to the authority of the
state judicial system.
The Court regarded almost every aspect of a legal action to be part of the
core of the state's judicial system. Whenever a state official or a state agency
is involved, the case implicates state interest regardless of the role that the
official plays. That official may be a county sheriff (Pennzoil and Huffman)
or a state judge (Juidice). The state agency may be the state supreme court
(Middlesex County), an administrative department (Moore and Trainor), or
merely a commission (Dayton Christian Schools).
The state's interest pervades from the beginning to the end. The interest
may arise in an administrative proceeding that precedes an action in the
ing) (Stewart joined Stevens' dissenting opinion); Trainor, 431 U.S. at 448 (Stewart, J., dissent-
ing); Juidice, 430 U.S. at 347 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun's switch from the
majority after the first four cases did not affect the outcome of the next three cases since Justice
O'Connor by then occupied Justice Stewart's seat. Justice O'Connor came to the Court in
time to fill the gap created by Justice Blackmun's migration from those Justices who would
readily apply the Younger abstention doctrine.
Justice Blackmun's departure from the majority is illuminating. This transition may serve
as a guide for charting the course that the Court has travelled. He parted company with the
majority for the first time in Middlesex County by joining Justice Marshall's concurring opin-
ion. 457 U.S. at 438 (Marshall, J., concurring). Marshall objected to applying Younger on the
basis of the proceeding's nature. Id. He did not think an administrative proceeding necessar-
ily afforded litigants the opportunity to raise constitutional issues. Id. at 438-39 (Marshall, J.,
concurring). To Marshall, the Court had moved far from the Younger requirement of a pend-
ing state criminal proceeding. Id.
Justice Blackmun next joined Justice Stevens's opinion concurring in the judgment in Day-
ton Christian Schools, 106 S. Ct. at 2724, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 523 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice
Stevens argued that, by giving such weight to the existence of ongoing state administrative
proceedings, the Court was doing exactly what the Court previously had proscribed in Steffel
v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462 (1974). Dayton Christian Schools, 106 S. Ct. at 2726 n.5, 91 L.
Ed. 2d at 526 n.5 (Stevens, J., concurring). The curtailment of access to the federal courts,
according to Justice Stevens, was too great and the expansion of the Younger abstention went
too far. Justice Blackmun adopted this argument as his own in Pennzoil. For a discussion of
his argument, see supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
Justice Blackmun remained consistent, even though he was the only Justice on the Court
that decided the present case to have changed his position. In Trainor, 431 U.S. at 448 (Black-
mun, J., concurring), he had already shown his concern for the possibility of expanding an
otherwise useful doctrine too far. While joining the majority opinion, he also wrote his own
concurring opinion. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring). His concern was the substantiality of the
state's interest. Id. As examples of proper holdings, he cited cases in which the Court held
that abstention was inappropriate because the state's interest was too remote or too "attenu-
ated." Id. at 449 (Blackmun, J., concurring). This attenuation was precisely his charge
against the majority in Pennzoil. See supra notes 153-58 and accompanying text. He came full
circle from his initial position and saw materialize exactly what he had feared.
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state court (Dayton Christian Schools and Middlesex County). It may arise
during the trial (Moore and Trainor). The state interest may even begin after
the trial, either before or after the court enters judgment (Pennzoil, Juidice
and Huffman). The setting may be either criminal (Younger) or civil
(Huffman-Pennzoil). One cannot hide from the broad expansion of the
Younger doctrine. Few alternative, but unpromising, avenues to the federal
courts remain for state litigants. 168
Timothy Kin Lee Hui
168. For a discussion of exceptional or extraordinary circumstances justifying federal inter-
vention under Younger, see supra note 40. Similarly, the Court would consider incompetence
on the part of the state adjudicator as extraordinary. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 577
(1973). The Court, however, has retreated even in this area. See Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S.
117, 126 n.6 (1975) (alleged collusion of state officials did not justify federal intervention).
Also, note that although future judgments approaching the amount in the Pennzoil case appear
unlikely, the Court did not consider $12 billion extraordinary. In an effort to circumvent the
abstention doctrine, a party could attempt to file in the federal court before the state action
begins. The Supreme Court in Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975), held that the impor-
tant date was not the date of filing, but the beginning of proceedings on the substance of the
merits. Id. at 349. Younger does not bar federal courts from issuing declaratory judgments
when no state proceeding is pending. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 711 (1977)
(Younger does not prohibit jurisdiction when criminal prosecution litigants seek relief from
prospective state prosecutions); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 930 (1975) (absence of
pending state prosecution); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 475 (1974) (federal jurisdiction
exists if plaintiff shows threat of enforcement of allegedly unconstitutional state act and no
pending state prosecution). In a purely private dispute, as in Pennzoil, a potential federal
plaintiff would need prophetic insight in order to use this approach.
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